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1 Introduction
The problem of boom-bust in capital flows to emerging markets is well recognized. The
present paper will examine which forms of capital flow are particularly problematic in
this respect and which are more stable, and will then examine what might be done to
stabilize the overall flow of private capital. The possibilities here may be decomposed
into altering either the volume or the behaviour of the various types of flow. There is
not much that can be done from the supply side to alter the relative volume of different
forms of capital flow; such policies as are available in this respect concern the capital
controls that may be exercised by capital-importing countries, a subject dealt with in
José Antonio Ocampo’s paper (2001). Hence this paper focuses on a discussion of ways
in which supply-side reforms might be able to alter the behaviour of certain types of
capital flow.
2 Diagnosis of where the problems lie
Conventional wisdom has long held that some forms of capital flow are much more
liable to rapid reversal than others. This view was challenged by Claessens et al. (1994),
who failed to find statistically significant differences in the time series properties of
different forms of capital flow (FDI, portfolio equity, long-term, short-term, banks,
government, and private). But in his discussion of this paper1, Guillermo Calvo
presciently pointed out that the authors’ estimates of volatility (which essentially
focused on the second moment of the time series) might fail to give due weight to what
is of most importance, the possibility of occasional major disruptions (which are
measured by higher moments in the time series). To judge by what happened in East
Asia during its recent crisis, where FDI was largely maintained while bank capital
reversed on a grand scale, it is indeed proper to worry much more about the volatility of
some forms of capital flow than of others. A new study by Robert Lipsey (2001) has
confirmed the conventional wisdom about the relative stability of FDI flows. This is not
to say that multinationals will refrain from shifting working balances among currencies
depending on their view of macroeconomic prospects, but just that such shifts are
unlikely to be large relative to the total sum sunk in capital investment. Large-scale
reversal is in most cases physically impossible.
Bank lending, which constituted the principal component of the capital flow reversal in
East Asia, was at the other extreme to FDI. The same thing was true in the debt crisis.
Common sense (and received wisdom) would suggest that short-term bank loans are
more prone to instability than long-term loans, an expectation that would again seem to
have been verified by the evaporation of inter-bank credit lines experienced by Korea in
late 1997. One reason that Claessens et al. failed to find any distinction in volatility
based on maturity may be that they lumped trade credits with other short-term credits
extended by banks. The usual belief is that trade credits are one of the less volatile
sources of finance, despite the fact that each individual credit is short-term, because
1 More clearly in the oral version than in the written version that appears after the Claessens-Dooley-
Warner paper.2
they are constantly renewed as new trade transactions need to be financed. It is the
residual item, bank claims that have a short term to maturity that are not trade-related,
that conventional wisdom holds to be particularly volatile.
It has been argued by Avinash Persaud (2000) that the recent moves to strengthen bank
risk management and prudential standards, and increase transparency, may even
intensify the problem of pro-cyclical behaviour by banks. He points to the increasing
use of DEAR (daily earnings at risk) limits as a tool of risk management that seems
perfectly rational when viewed from the standpoint of the individual bank, but that can
work to increase volatility. The DEAR sets a limit on how much the bank is prepared to
risk losing over the following day with, say, one percent probability.
It is calculated by taking the bank’s portfolio…and estimating the future
distribution of daily returns based on past measures of market correlation
and volatility. Both rising volatility and rising correlation will increase
the potential loss of the portfolio, increasing DEAR…When DEAR exceeds
the limit, the bank reduces exposure, often by switching into less volatile
and less correlated assets.
Daily publication of statistics can accelerate and intensify the spread of any bad news
that may break, with declining asset values and increasing volatility serving as
sophisticated positive feedback mechanisms.
So much for the easy cases. The interesting question concerns the volatility of other
claims that can be sold quickly, notably portfolio equity and long-term bonds. There
was indeed a reduction in the flow of portfolio investment to East Asia in 1997–98,
although nothing like the reversal seen in the case of bank lending. There is an
important reason why one should expect less volatility in the case of portfolio equity
than in the case of short-term loans: the price of the relevant asset (shares) can adjust,
rather than all the adjustment taking place in the volume. Indeed, if a shock has the
same impact on the future expectations of domestic and foreign investors in shares, then
one would expect that all the resulting adjustment would show up in a change in share
prices, with no consequences for capital flows or exchange rates. (Large and abrupt
declines in share prices can also create problems, especially where expectations are
endogenous and extrapolative rather than exogenous and regressive. Personally I would
nonetheless argue that the stock market is a rather good place to absorb the impact of
changes in expectations, because the links from the stock market to the real economy
tend to be weak in the short term.) It is only when foreign investors lose their nerve
about the prospects for a country or region in a way that domestic investors do not, as in
East Asia in 1997, that one should expect an impact on capital flows.
Empirical evidence is not as reassuring as those theoretical considerations might have
led one to expect. Froot et al. (1998) found evidence that equity flows are persistent
over time and that investors often buy (sell) in response to a price rise (decline).
Kaminsky et al. (1999) concluded that mutual funds have had a destabilizing impact and
have helped spread contagion in Latin America. It also seems that Chilean pension
funds made almost no use of their new rights to invest abroad during Chile’s capital
inflow surge, but then began placing funds abroad on a big scale when capital flow
reversal occurred after the East Asian crisis (Ffrench-Davis and Tapia 2001). Bekaert et
al. (1999) find that when equity capital leaves it does so faster than when it entered,
suggesting that it is not after all so difficult to find domestic purchasers. Only Barth and3
Zhang (1999) found no evidence that foreign investors had played a destabilizing role:
indeed, they claim that in only one month (December 1997, see p.201) were mutual
funds net sellers in the four main crisis countries of East Asia. And while they refer to
some investors as having been attracted ‘into the Asian markets with a short-term
horizon seeking high returns’ (p.199), they also argue that the figures show that foreign
institutional investors were slow to exit after the crisis started, as a result of which they
lost a lot of money (pp.202–5).
Korea has a particularly rich data set (although there are doubts about its reliability) that
has enabled investigators to trace the strategy of individual investors in a way that is not
possible elsewhere. The first study to exploit this source, that of Choe, Kho, and Stulz
(1999), suggested that while the trades of foreign investors were destabilizing before the
crisis, the foreign investors acted as a stabilizing force during the crisis. However, their
data extended only briefly into the crisis period, and the subsequent study of Kim and
Wei (1999a) concluded that foreign institutional and (even more) individual investors
had been positive feedback traders (i.e. had bought in response to a price rise and sold in
response to a price fall) both before and during the crisis. The only exception to this
procyclical behaviour was prior to the crisis by those foreign institutions that had a
Korean office; these were contrarian traders (i.e. they had tended to buy recent losers
and sell recent winners). Kim and Wei also calculated that a contrarian strategy would
have been more profitable than a positive-feedback strategy, which suggests that the
Koreans who must perforce have been following such a strategy (as the counterpart of
the foreign positive-feedback strategies) must have made money, or at least lost less
money, as compared to the foreigners. Kim and Wei (1999b) also found evidence that
mutual funds based in the USA and the UK engaged in positive-feedback trading, and to
some extent in herding behaviour, in Korea in 1997–98.2
Note that all these studies focus on portfolio equity investment in the stock markets of
emerging countries. As Barth and Zhang (1999) point out, portfolio equity is invested in
emerging markets through two other channels as well. One is in the form of private (i.e.
non-traded) equity. Barth and Zhang’s Figure 6.2 suggests that in East Asia this is a
small but rather stable flow. The other is by emerging market companies listing their
shares on international markets like New York (of dominant importance for Latin
American companies) or London (ditto for South African companies). Barth and
Zhang’s Tables 6–12 show that international placements became of major importance in
the mid-1990s and peaked in 1997, before falling substantially in 1998. The decline in
international placements was nevertheless modest compared to that in foreign
investment in local stock markets: it went from US$ 6 billion in 1996 to US$ 11 billion
in 1997 to US$ 4 billion in 1998, while investment in local markets fell from US$ 9
billion in 1996 to minus US$ 3 billion in 1997 to plus US$ 1 billion in 1998.
Authoritative sources assert that the sharp reduction in the inflow of portfolio equity to
East Asia during the 1997 crisis reflects quite different behaviour on the part of two
different groups of investors (an account consistent with the report of Barth and Zhang
1999, p.197). The withdrawals were made by global funds that had been searching for
2 They set out to test the hypotheses that mutual funds based offshore are more prone to heavy trading,
to positive (procyclical) feedback trading, and to herding behavior than are onshore funds. They found
to their surprise that funds based in the USA and the UK were actually the ones more prone to positive
feedback trading and to herding behavior, although the offshore funds did tend to trade more heavily.4
high-yielding investments and had been attracted by the high yields in East Asian share
markets prior to the crisis, but which had not advertised their investments in emerging
markets. They were embarrassed to be holding assets whose value collapsed, and got
out as fast as they could, before their holdings became widely known and criticized.
But, according to this account, the holdings by funds that advertised that they were
investing in emerging markets remained steady, and may even have picked up some of
the shares being sold by the former group, perhaps to sustain their target asset
allocations. These investors are in emerging markets for the long haul, aware that these
are inherently risky markets that will have downs as well as ups, and neither the
managers of the funds nor their investors panicked. Worryingly, Griffith-Jones (2001)
suggests that the importance of global funds has in recent years increased relative to that
of dedicated emerging market funds.
Does Milton Friedman’s famous 1953 theorem which says that destabilizing speculators
must lose money (because to destabilize a market one must buy near the peak and sell
near the trough, whereas making money requires the opposite) reassure one that funds
that amplify the boom-bust cycle will lose money and so at least enrich domestic
investors? Not necessarily. One possibility is that alluded to earlier, that the counterpart
to the sales by foreigners will be purchases by other foreigners. But even if foreign
portfolio investors do indeed on balance follow the herd, buying when the market is
rising and selling when it is falling, so that in total domestic investors are selling when
the market is rising and buying when it is falling, it does not necessarily follow that the
foreigners will lose money. Buying on a rising market and buying near the peak are not
the same thing; speculators who are alert to changes in trend may be able to quit buying,
and sell out, soon after the peak is past, and make money. The empirical studies
reported above offer a contradictory verdict on whether many foreign investors in fact
got out of East Asia sufficiently quickly to have saved their skins. What is quite clear is
that foreign investors in total lost an enormous sum of money in East Asia, at least on
paper: some US$ 166 billion during 1997, according to the calculations of Barth and
Zhang (1999, p.204).
Much the same analysis applies to long-term bonds, whose prices also fluctuate in
response to changes in expectations in such a way as to ensure that the total stock of
bonds continues to be willingly held. However, nominally long-term bonds sometimes
include put options, giving the holder the right to demand early repayment at his
discretion on certain dates. If such dates coincide with a crisis, then the loan tends to
disappear just when it is most needed, as happened in Korea in late 1997.
While the holdings of those who buy emerging markets assets to hold them may not be
as stable as one might wish, a largely separate and perhaps more acute problem is posed
by overtly speculative activities. Hedge funds, institutions whose managers quite
consciously range the world looking for market anomalies or good speculative bets that
are expected to yield high returns and which are totally unregulated on the ground that
only rich people who do not need protection invest in them, are the archetype. The
proprietary trading desks of investment banks and other financial companies
(commercial banks, securities firms, and even a few insurance companies) behave
similarly. It is the hedge funds that were the butt of Prime Minister Mahathir’s
criticisms in 1997, but Henry Kaufman (2000) asserts that virtually all investment
institutions have now adopted this investment style for at least an important part of their
activities.5
The actions of these investors in 1998 came under critical official scrutiny in the report
of the Market Dynamics Study Group of the Financial Stability Forum’s Working
Group on Highly Leveraged Institutions (Financial Stability Forum 2000). The Group
examined the ‘possible destabilizing impact of large and concentrated HLI positions (in
1998) and the implications for market integrity of various aggressive practices’ (p.97).
The economies with which they were concerned were Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia,
New Zealand, Singapore, and South Africa, although New Zealand and Singapore
expressed less concern than the other four. These countries experienced strong pressures
in their foreign exchange and domestic financial markets in the middle of 1998. By then
it was pretty clear that all the currencies (except the Hong Kong dollar, which is fixed
with a currency board) were undervalued, yet the speculative pressures were all for
further depreciation. This was the time when the Hong Kong Monetary Authority upset
the free market fundamentalists by buying up a big chunk of the equity market to defend
itself against the double play. The pressures were relieved in September and gave way
to a sharp rebound in early October as the HLIs were forced to deliver following the
collapse of LTCM.
The report documents the fact that a handful of HLIs established such large short
positions in these currencies as to stretch the capacity of natural counterparties (like
exporters) to offset their positions. The question that an economist instinctively asks is
how they expected to make money out of such operations. It is one thing to have the
market power to force a price below its fundamental value, it is quite another to make
money out of forcing it there. To do that, one needs to be able to get others to sell the
currency at even more undervalued levels, so as to be able to close out one’s short sales
at a profit. In the case of Hong Kong, the HLIs sought to profit by the ‘double play’,
which involved selling equities short and then selling the Hong Kong dollar short,
relying on the automatic interest rate rise generated by the currency board rules in order
to force equity prices down. This would have yielded them a profit even if the Hong
Kong dollar was not devalued as long as the Hong Kong Monetary Authority played by
the rules of the game (which it didn’t, because it intervened to buy the equity index).
But in other cases the HLIs could have expected to profit only if they panicked the
market.
The evidence is that that is exactly what they tried to do. The report discusses
aggressive practices, in the form of ‘talking the book’, which means disseminating
rumours designed to influence prices so as to benefit the positions already taken. A
m a n a g e ro fa nHLI large enough to have significant market power might make negative
comments on a currency that would discourage other market participants taking
contrary positions. Some financial institutions are reported to have published ‘research
conclusions’ designed to influence the market (‘positions led research rather than vice
versa’, p.106). They exploited momentum trading by other participants by trading
heavily at illiquid hours, apparently attempting to move rates rather than to get
transactions executed at the best possible prices. HLIs at times took correlated positions,
both within and across markets, one might presume by design though no one could
prove that it was not by coincidence. These tactics at times succeeded in driving many
regular traders out of the market for fear that they would be overwhelmed by HLIst h a t
were not playing by the normal rules of a competitive market. At other times other
market participants were ‘emboldened to add to momentum’ (p.107), or at least not to
stand in the way of positioning by large HLIs. And some HLIs were able to take
advantage of knowledge of the impact of price changes, e.g. proprietary trading desks6
were able to take advantage of knowledge as to when declining bond prices would
require bond sales by swap desks, or they might be able to push rates through levels that
they knew would trigger stop-loss orders or knock-out options.
The study group did not reach consensus on the role and importance of the aggressive
trading practices that it documented, but it is pretty clear that most members of the
group concluded that they threatened market integrity. After making a host of careful
qualifications, the report concluded:
The group is concerned about the possible impact on market dynamics of
some of the aggressive practices cited in the case-study economies
during 1998; it is not, however, able to reach a conclusion on the scale of
these practices, whether manipulation was involved and their impact on
market integrity. Some group members believe that the threshold for
assessing manipulation can be set too high and that some of the
aggressive practices raise important issues for market integrity. They are
of the view that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that attempted
manipulation can and does occur in foreign exchange markets and should
be a serious concern for policymakers.
It is difficult to imagine a much more damning indictment coming from a group of
officials.
3 Strategic issues
The focus here will be on making individual types of capital flows less unstable, rather
than on trying to influence the mix of different forms of capital flows (a topic treated by
Ocampo’s paper 2001). A good place to start considering what might be done in this
connection is by considering why portfolio equity seems to have disappointed the
expectations of those like me who argued it was unlikely to pose problems of instability.
I conjecture that the reason lies in the way that financial markets operate. Consider what
Henry Kaufman (2000, p.61) recently wrote:
As markets and assets have changed dramatically with the emergence of
a new global financial system, so has the composition of financial
institutions themselves. The power and influence of traditional
commercial banks, savings and loans, and insurance companies have
diminished, while a new breed of institutional participants has come to
the fore. These institutions are distinguished by their emphasis on short-
term investment performance, their heavy use of leverage, and their
willingness to move in and out of markets – whether equities, bonds,
currencies, or commodities – in a relentless quest to maximize returns.
The new breed includes the often-reviled hedge funds, although they are
neither the sole nor the leading contestants. In fact, most prominent
banks, securities firms, and even a few insurance companies possess
departments that emulate the trading and investment approach of the
hedge funds. Even the corporate treasuries of a number of non-financial
corporations are engaged in this activity. Once arcane and exotic, the
hedge fund approach to investment has been mainstreamed.7
In other words, the financial markets are currently dominated by investment managers
with a short-termist philosophy, based on the truism that to maximize returns in each
and every short run necessarily maximizes returns over the long run as well. What it
clearly does not maximize is the usefulness of financial markets to those who raise
funds from them.
A key question is whether short-termist management is really in the interest of the
ultimate investors, the individuals who buy mutual funds and the institutions whose
endowments and working assets are under management. The contrary argument has
been developed by David Swensen (2000), the chief investment officer of Yale
University who inter alia manages its endowment. The basic argument is that short-
termist management risks whiplash (selling an asset just before it rises or buying it just
before its peak) and undermines the likelihood of systematic contrarian investment
(buying what is currently out of fashion and selling what is currently in fashion). Such
actions often seem unthinkable in the short run, but the evidence is that on average they
are more often right than wrong.
The basic characteristics of a long-term investment strategy as laid out by Swensen
involve a strategic decision to divide the portfolio among asset classes in target
proportions based on long-run risk-return characteristics. Within each asset class, assets
are managed by individual managers who are selected according to their performance
relative to the rest of the asset class, as in the conventional short-termist approach. But
the strategic element in this strategy leads to results exactly contrary to those yielded by
the DEAR approach described above. For example, a market run on emerging market
assets leads to purchase of more such assets, in order to restore the proportion of the
portfolio in that asset class to its target share, rather than to the sale of similar assets, as
under DEAR. This tends to stabilize markets rather than destabilize them.
Which strategy yields better results to the ultimate investor? The Yale endowment
managed by David Swensen has indeed achieved superior returns. But so have most of
the hedge funds, the example par excellence of the short-termist approach. What both
have in common is superior management. One would need much more systematic
comparison to be able to draw any strong conclusion about the superiority of one
approach over the other, from the standpoint of its ability to generate results to the
ultimate investor. What one can surely say is that there is no reason to accept as
axiomatic the self-serving claim of the short-termists that any approach other than theirs
is self-evidently at the cost of the investor.
Perhaps the biggest difficulty with the long-term approach concerns the difficulty of
monitoring the performance of investment managers in real time. If one abandons the
discipline of regular comparisons with the behaviour of a peer group, poorly performing
managers get too much opportunity to plead that they are currently invested in what is
unfashionable and that patience is needed to give time for the market to realize the error
of its ways. But the best antidote to the lack of that discipline is to demand the presence
of an alternative form of discipline, in the form of a coherent long-term strategy such as
that described above. Trustees are those who should ensure that this alternative
discipline is in place; one problem is that they can be as prone to panic (the great enemy
of contrarian investing) as anyone else.8
Even though at this stage I cannot prove it, the presumption is that ultimate investors
and borrowers share a common interest in securing a shift from the currently dominant
mode of short-termist investment management to the long-term strategy described
above. They share a common enemy, in the form of the portfolio management industry
as currently organized. This has an interest in maintaining remuneration largely based
on frequent short-term comparisons with the performance of their peers, which
generates high remuneration, and lots of portfolio churning, so as to generate
commission income to pay the high salaries. The question to consider is whether
anything can be done through public policy to tilt the balance of advantage toward those
investment managers who employ a long-term strategy. The remainder of the paper
consists of brief explorations of several possible ideas that might help push things that
way.
4 An amended UDROP
Perhaps the most promising possibility in this connection is presented by an idea that
has surfaced as a result of the repeated experience of financial crises and the costs they
impose on their victims: that it should be possible to declare a standstill on debt service
payments. Many observers have come to feel that, with private capital flows as large
and volatile as they now are, the only response to the outbreak of a currency crisis is to
create the ability to interrupt a run by force majeure. This conclusion has been
reinforced by the view that the countries that came out of recent financial crises
relatively quickly and least badly scarred are those (notably Korea and Brazil) where the
authorities quickly negotiated a lengthening of debt maturities with an important class
of creditors. The thought is that in many of these crises the problem is one of illiquidity
rather than insolvency; the country would be capable of honouring its obligations
without a cut in their present value (‘debt relief’) if only the repayment obligations were
spread out over a longer time period, but the incentive of any individual creditor is to
cut and run. In this situation, one needs to solve the creditors’ coordination problem by
giving them an incentive to come to the table and quickly negotiate a debt restructuring.
A standstill could provide the incentive, by eliminating the option of cut and run. The
problem is how to provide that possibility when it is needed without destroying the
principle of the sanctity of debt contracts that underlies any capital market. Note also
that successful design of a standstill mechanism might have the attractive feature of
sabotaging the investment strategy of the short-termists while leaving long-term
strategies relatively unscathed.
To consider the possibilities here, start with the most concrete proposal for a standstill
that has yet been tabled, the UDROP proposal of Willem Buiter and Anne Sibert (1999).
UDROP is the acronym for Universal Debt Rollover Option with a Penalty. In their own
words:
All foreign-currency IOUs must have a rollover option attached to them.
This includes private and sovereign, long-term and short-term,
marketable and non-marketable, negotiable and non-negotiable debt,
including overdrafts, credit lines, and contingent claims…All borrowers,
public and private, must be given the option…9
The option would entitle the borrower, at his sole discretion, to extend
maturing debt for a specified period (say three or six months) at a
penalty rate. The borrower would be entitled to the rollover only if the
debt in question had been serviced in full, barring the final repayment…
We expect the penalty spread and other features of the rollover contract
to be negotiated between debtors and creditors, rather than decreed by a
government or international body (pp.231-32).
Buiter and Sibert emphasize that their scheme is intended only to help an otherwise
solvent borrower that is unable to roll over its foreign currency debt because of a
liquidity crisis. However, most crises are not pure panics that are resolved simply by the
passage of time. They arise when creditors develop doubts about the ability of debtors
to service their debts on the contractually agreed terms, and they end when those doubts
are resolved. One has to ask why a six-month delay without any restructuring of debt
beyond that point should allay such fears: surely the presumption is that the debtor’s
condition will be essentially the same as it was when the UDROP was exercised, which
suggests a danger that all it would accomplish would be to delay the crisis.
Nevertheless, an amended version of the UDROP proposal would be a natural
complement to the sort of ideas for an international bankruptcy mechanism that were
recently floated by Anne Krueger (2001). Enforcing a standstill as she envisages would
be much easier if all international loans included a clause that could be invoked to
extend the maturity of the loan in the event of the borrowing country facing a crisis. To
transform this into a proposal that could serve the function of a standstill, however, one
would need to alter the term for which the rollover would apply.
The diagnosis of what is needed to end a debt crisis that was offered above suggests that
the need is likely to be for an extension of much more than six months. The three-year
extension of maturities that was negotiated between Korea and its bank creditors at the
end of 1997, would seem much more likely to be typical. In fact, this is a dimension that
probably should not be prespecified, but negotiated between debtor and a creditor
committee ad hoc as and when the rollover option is invoked. The creditors will
presumably seek the shortest rollover period that gives assurance of allowing the debtor
to restore its liquidity and exit from crisis. But if they are recalcitrant in agreeing to a
realistic time frame, the debtor would be relieved of the obligation of paying
amortization pro tem. The incentive for the debtor to agree to the shortest realistic
period for the rollover is to preserve its standing in the capital markets.
Creditors have reacted adversely to the UDROP idea. If it turned out they are so strongly
averse to it as to bring lending to a halt, one might exempt long-term loans above a
certain maturity. Trade credits might be allowed to satisfy the requirement by a
provision that a given volume of credits revolve over time, on the model of the banks’
1998 agreement with Brazil. But the loans that should not be exempted, no matter how
severe the impact on volume, are short-term loans. It is true that UDROP would add to the
risk of short-term lending to a debtor whose medium-term position looks doubtful, but
that is the point. Short-termist lenders find it more difficult to persuade themselves that
they can buy short-term assets and then win the race to the exits if things go wrong. The
game where investment bankers advise their clients that it is safe to buy short-term
assets from country X because it looks safe enough for the next n months would be10
undercut. Only investors willing to make a relatively long-term commitment would
invest in emerging market loans, and those are the only investors worth having.
UDROP would not, of course, resolve the problem posed by short-termist investors in the
equity markets. Perhaps that is a problem that we are going to have to live with.
5 Trading guidelines for foreign exchange markets
In reaction to the criticisms of the Sub-Group on Market Dynamics of the Study Group
on Highly Leveraged Institutions of the Financial Stability Forum that was referred to
above, a group of 16 leading banks announced a voluntary code of conduct in February
2001. The idea is that if all the leading banks subscribe to these principles, and deny
liquidity to parties whom they believe to be violating them, then there will be no further
incidents similar to those of August-September 1998. The principles they announced
are:
i) Banks should be sensitive to market risk and credit management and pay
special attention to the financing of trades in a currency experiencing high
volatility.
ii) Foreign exchange managers should pay particular care in executing orders in
times of volatility and market-makers may reserve the right to refuse customer
transactions that they feel may further disrupt or intend to disrupt markets.
iii) Stop/loss orders. Foreign exchange managers should communicate frequently
with customers on market developments, especially regarding individual
trigger levels.
iv) Caution should be taken that customers’ interests are not exploited when
financial intermediaries trade for their own account.
v) Institutions should be attentive at all times to ensure the independence and
integrity of any market-related research they publish.
vi) Financial intermediaries should implement rigorous guidelines on the handling
of rumours. Dealers should not relay information that they know is false or
suspect may be inaccurate.
vii) Manipulative practices by banks with each other or with clients constitute
unacceptable trading behaviour.
viii) Foreign exchange trading management should prohibit the deliberate
exploitation of electronic dealing systems to generate artificial price behaviour.
It is rather sad that it is necessary for leading financial institutions to announce that in
future they will consider it bad form to manipulate their clients or to publish research
that lacks integrity, but perhaps we should be thankful for small mercies. At present
there appears to be no intention to supervise whether the banks live up to their voluntary
code. It would be worth adding this to the tasks imposed on supervisors.11
6 Limitation to investment-grade bonds
Investors with fiduciary responsibilities, like insurance companies, are forbidden (at
least in the United States) to hold bonds that are less than investment grade. At first
glance that may seem sensible, since it precludes these institutions abusing their
position of trust by using their investors’ money to buy risky assets. What does not
make sense, however, is that this requirement is specified in terms of what they may
hold rather than what they may acquire. The difference can be crucial. In late 1997,
insurance companies holding Korean bonds were forced by this requirement to sell them
in the midst of the market implosion, when the credit rating agencies had panicked and
suddenly cut Korea’s rating to below investment grade. The holders were not allowed to
exercise their judgement as to whether Korean bonds remained a good investment
(which they certainly were after their price had collapsed), they were forced to sell and
add to the pressures on Korea, at the cost of their clients. Any such requirement should
be redrafted to limit what fiduciary investors can buy rather than what they can hold.
That would prevent their being forced to sell in response to a credit downgrading, as
happened in Korea in late 1997. As well as making bond lending somewhat more stable,
this change would reduce the premium on short-termist assessment of whether and
when credit ratings may change.
7 Put options in bond contracts
A five-year loan with a put option exercisable in six-months’ time is not really a five-
year bond; from an economic standpoint it is a short-term, six-month loan with a
rollover provision if the lender consents. It should be counted as such in the statistics.
Correct reporting would force both the borrowers and their national authorities to
recognize the risks that are being taken. One would expect that this would diminish the
attractiveness of agreeing to the inclusion of put options in bond contracts, and hence
lengthen the effective maturity of bonds.
8 Collective action clauses
One of the reasons that helped motivate the switch from bank lending in the 1970s to
bond lending in the 1990s, was without much doubt the lesser vulnerability of bonds to
restructuring when a country ran into debt servicing problems. This was based in
particular on provisions that were introduced into New York law in 1939 to restrain
abusive debt buybacks that had the effect of arbitrarily expropriating some creditors
(Buchheit and Gulati 2000, pp.66–7). The provisions in question require unanimous
consent by the bondholders to any change in the terms of the payment clauses, which
are those clauses that specify the sums to be paid in debt service and the dates when
payments are due. This gives a single recalcitrant bondholder – or a vulture fund that
buys up distressed debt – the ability either to prevent a debt reconstruction when that is
necessary, or else the ability to insist on full repayment even when other holders have
agreed to accept less. Indeed, such a bondholder can normally expect to demand, and
win from the courts, accelerated repayment, when normal debt service was interrupted
before the debt reconstruction. Naturally the prospect that some creditors would not
make sacrifices when others did, and that the debtor would indeed be able to service the12
claims of the holdouts precisely because the others agreed to accept a write-down of
their claims, made the majority reluctant to endorse bond restructurings. It could even
be that the debtor would be unable to honour the revised debt terms because of the
payment it was forced to make to the holdout bondholders.
As long as bonds were a small part of the total claims outstanding, it was simpler to
allow them to remain intact when bank claims were restructured. It was clear that this
could not continue if debtors ran into trouble when bonds had become a large part of the
total debt, and indeed the official sector has in recent years started to call for private
sector involvement in debt workouts (Group of 10, 1996). Led by Eichengreen and
Portes (1995), a number of economists had already at that time started to advocate the
introduction of collective action clauses3 into all bond contracts in order to facilitate the
restructuring of bonds when necessary. When this proposal was first mooted, there were
dire predictions from some of the New York-based lenders, echoed by some of their
clients, that any attempt to include such clauses would bring lending to a halt, or at the
least lead to drastic increases in interest rates. Then someone realized that about one-
third of such bonds, namely most of those signed in London, already include such
clauses. Eichengreen and Mody (2000a,b) therefore examined whether the inclusion of
such clauses had resulted in higher interest rates to the borrowers, as per the prediction.
It turned out that the impact was modest and also, interestingly, that the direction of
impact depended upon the borrower’s creditworthiness. Countries with poor credit
ratings did indeed have to pay somewhat more to borrow with the added security of
collective action clauses, presumably reflecting lender concern that a lack of willingness
to pay might lead borrowers to abuse the clauses, even when they would have been able
to pay. But countries with good credit ratings actually paid somewhat less, presumably
reflecting lender recognition that the clauses would reduce the cost of restructuring debt
(and the possible interruption in debt service payments while this happened) in the
remote contingency that the countries should encounter an inability to pay so that
restructuring proved necessary.
The lawyers have now found a way of reconstructing bonds issued under New York
law, even without collective action clauses (Buchheit and Gulati 2000). The key is to
accompany the offer to swap old bonds for the new bonds that contain the revised
payment terms by amendments to the non-payment clauses of the old bonds in ways that
make these much less attractive and impede any holdout bondholders from successfully
litigating to demand continued or accelerated payment. For example, the old bonds may
be de-listed, the waiver of sovereign immunity may be withdrawn, and negative pledge
protection may be removed, all without the need for unanimity that prevents revision of
the payments clauses. Since these disfiguring amendments to the terms of the old bonds
are adopted simultaneously with bondholders exchanging their old bonds for the new
debt instruments, they are known as ‘exit consents’. Exit consents were used in
restructuring junk bonds in the 1980s, but Ecuador in 1999 seems to have been the first
country to use the technique to restructure sovereign bonds.
3 This is the term given to clauses allowing a bondholders’ meeting to be convened to consider a debt
reconstruction, rules allowing interest and amortization terms to be modified by a qualified majority
of bondholders, sharing clauses, etc.13
Exit consents have one great advantage over collective action clauses. They can be used
to deal with the stock of old bonds, rather than simply allowing today’s new issues to be
restructured in the future. They also have one great disadvantage: that they do not give
total protection against the threat of litigation by holdouts. An optimal strategy for an
emerging market (or at least for one with a reputation as a good creditor) would be to
ensure that all new bonds contain collective action clauses, while being ready to use exit
consents on old bonds should the need arise. It would be very easy to ensure that its new
bonds contain such clauses: all it need do is shift its borrowing to London until New
York law is amended so that the terms of its standard bond contract include collective
action clauses.
Might the inclusion of collective action clauses in bond contracts actually make bonds
more attractive for creditors to hold as well as making life easier for debtors if the worst
materializes? That depends on the net outcome of two opposing considerations. On the
one hand, collective action clauses will reduce the cost and disruption of debt
restructuring should the debtor become unable to pay on the originally contracted terms.
On the other hand, the greater ease of renegotiating terms may encourage a debtor to
succumb to the temptation to avoid paying when it could have done. The evidence on
bond pricing of Eichengreen and Mody implies that investors are able to discriminate
between the countries in which each effect dominates, which suggests that they are
unlikely to suffer if collective action clauses become routine. By making more explicit
the possibility that bonds will have to be restructured, one would expect collective
action clauses to make potential buyers weigh the chances that they will be invoked,
which will help to curb short-termism. Those who still buy them are therefore more
likely to prove patient holders.
9 Currency of denomination
One reason that currency crises tend to be so disruptive is that foreign lending to an
emerging market country is virtually always denominated in either dollars or (if
different) the currency of the lender. This means that any devaluation increases the
borrowing country’s foreign liabilities in terms of its domestic currency, which can, in
extreme cases, threaten widespread bankruptcy in the financial and/or corporate sectors
(as happened in East Asia in 1997). In contrast, many industrial countries do borrow
predominantly in their own currencies, which makes an exchange-rate change far less
threatening.
One change that would therefore seem highly desirable would be to use the borrower’s
currency to denominate international loans. Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) have
implied that this is inconceivable by describing emerging market countries as suffering
‘original sin’. No evidence is presented to justify the innuendo that the practice of
denominating loans in foreign currencies is unalterable. In fact there are occasional
instances of emerging countries that borrow in their own currencies, of which the major
example is South Africa. Instead of dismissing the possibility of achieving such a
desirable reform, it makes more sense to try and understand why it happens so rarely
and, thereby, what conditions might be necessary to make it the norm.14
Why might lenders seek to avoid currency exposure? The strongest reason is a desire to
avoid holding assets in a currency whose authorities have a record of irresponsible
macroeconomic management that may lead to unpredictable losses through devaluation.
But most emerging markets have got beyond the stage where they imagine that cheating
their creditors is a clever strategy. Since most emerging market countries have domestic
interest rates higher than dollar interest rates at most times, the expectation would be
that a lender would earn more from loans denominated in the borrowers’ currency in
normal times. Indeed, there is a presumption that the currency risk premium would in
the long run tend to make domestic currency borrowing more expensive to the borrower
and more remunerative to the lender. What it would accomplish, is to redistribute
obligations to pay away from times when payment is particularly onerous to those when
it is less problematic. Agreement to denominate loans in the local currency would
essentially redistribute earnings over time, in such a way as to diminish the pressures on
the borrowers at particularly difficult times, without diminishing – indeed, while
probably increasing – the present value of expected earnings. A lender that was
particularly concerned to avoid showing a balance-sheet loss could cover its position in
the forward market (whether the borrowing country would still reduce its risks in the
event of a devaluation would depend on whether the cover was provided by a domestic
or foreign party). This suggests that it is pretty difficult to justify lenders’ obsession
with avoiding foreign currency exposure.
The greater security of own-currency borrowing was already recognized by the 1988
Basel Accord, which allowed the preferential 20 per cent risk weight to apply to long-
term bank lending in non-OECD countries when it was denominated in, and financed in,
the local currency. The policy question is whether the industrial countries should not go
further and drop the requirement that the lending be financed by local currency deposits
or borrowing, and thus give an incentive for foreign lending to be denominated in the
local currency.
10 Remuneration practices
Most managers in the asset management business face a remuneration structure that is
intended to align their personal incentives with the welfare of their principals. This takes
the form of a base salary that is augmented by the possibility of earning a substantial
bonus for superior performance. The base salary is intended to secure a reasonable
standard of living for the manager even if his performance is normal, while the bonus
pays him a part of the benefit that would accrue to his principal if his returns are
exceptional, thus providing him with an incentive to strive to achieve such exceptional
returns. The bonus is normally based on the extent to which the portfolio he manages
achieves a higher return than the norm for the asset class in which he is investing, as
measured by the index for that asset class.
The problem with this solution is that the time frame over which bonuses are defined
may not be long enough for a contrarian investment policy to bear fruit. If bonuses were
paid annually and fads lasted only a few months, then the bonus system would give a
manager the right incentives. But if bonuses are paid on an annual basis (or worse, as is
normal in mutual funds, quarterly), while fads can last for years at a time, then a
responsible investment manager who makes long-term contrarian investments can find
himself foregoing bonuses for long periods. Worse, he may risk getting fired for falling15
behind the index for a period shorter than a fad can last. The bonus system is an attempt
to respond to a real problem of making sure that managers act in the interest of their
principals, but it can provide an incentive for managers to compete to beat the index in
the short run and make sure they do not depart too far from it in the longer run, a
behaviour that can amplify and prolong fads.
The importance attached to a manager’s performance relative to his/her chosen
benchmark has the unfortunate result of inducing herd behaviour on the part of
managers. However strongly s/he may believe a security to be misvalued by the market,
s/he simply cannot afford to follow his/her convictions if s/he believes that the crowd is
going to perpetuate its error for any length of time. That way s/he risks not merely his or
her bonus, but even his or her job. Professional prudence dictates not straying too far
from the benchmark, i.e. not defying the herd.
Since the problem is that the bonus design gives an incentive to follow the herd in the
short run without paying proper attention to the likely long-run consequences of where
the herd is heading, it seems natural to explore the possibility of introducing longer-run
performance into the design. Suppose, for example, that a manager were paid their
bonus only with a delay, and then only if subsequent events had not established that
his/her investment strategy was flawed. This would provide a very concrete incentive to
assess the longer-term sustainability of the strategy s/he was choosing to pursue. And it
would not be difficult to use tax policy to encourage all asset management organizations
to revise their remuneration practices in this way: one could provide that bonuses paid
more promptly or without appropriate conditionality would not count as an expense that
the employer was entitled to deduct from revenue in calculating taxable profit.
Such an approach would be relatively easy if asset managers stayed in the same job for
their whole career, but difficulties arise when a manager quits. One surely would not
want to give an artificial incentive to accelerate turnover by paying out the bonus
unconditionally to any manager who quit his/her job. Could one notionally freeze the
portfolio as it was on the leaving date and apply the agreed test to that hypothetical
portfolio? Since managers change their portfolios quite frequently, that would hardly
seem just. Would one look at the performance achieved by his/her successor and assume
that the departing manager’s policy would have been the same? If that were a good
assumption, one has to doubt whether it was worth changing the manager. Would one
require the departing manager to continue managing a hypothetical portfolio for the
succeeding five years to establish that s/he could have achieved the hurdle level of
performance? This is a problem where more research is going to be needed.
An alternative approach would involve more radical change in the way the industry
functions, with trustees taking a bigger part of the burden on themselves. Instead of
hiring managers to make the critical decisions, and seeking to blame those managers
when things go wrong, trustees could themselves decide to buy and hold for the long
term. Or they could decide that a certain proportion of their portfolio was going to be
invested in an asset class like emerging market bonds and then hire a manger to look
after it for five or ten years, with a bonus to be determined only at the end of that period
on the basis of cumulative performance over the whole period. They might even
experiment with assigning a portfolio to a manager for a ten-year period and relying on
his/her sense of professional responsibility to motivate him or her to act in the best long-
term interest of the principals. This assumes that there are competent people who find16
that a professional challenge provides sufficient motivation for exceptional effort,
without a need for monetary incentives, which is normally taken for granted in many
other professional areas.
11 Concluding remarks
The boom-bust cycle in lending to emerging markets is exaggerated by the short-termist
nature of modern financial markets and the incentives to which the individual
participants in those markets are subject. While some reforms, such as getting the banks
to abide by their voluntary code of conduct, may be relatively easy to achieve, most of
the other easy ones (like requiring proper accounting of bonds with put options) seem
unlikely to achieve a great deal. Changing remuneration patterns might be important
although it looks difficult to find a formula that will work satisfactorily for those who
change jobs. Perhaps the most hopeful possibility is to develop the idea of allowing
standstills to be invoked in a crisis, in which context an amended UDROP clause in loan
contracts might prove helpful.17
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